Here's why he couldn't walk away. On 3 August, the CIA confirmed that "Hanois naval units have displayed increasing sensitivity to U.S. and South Vietnamese naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin during the past several months. Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. President Johnson ordered a halt to all 34A operations "to avoid sending confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin." But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." The World is a public radio program that crosses borders and time zones to bring home the stories that matter. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, 5. The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American soldier casualties. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. Thus, the South Vietnamese raid on Hon Me Island, a major North Vietnamese infiltration staging point, became the tripwire that set off the August 2 confrontation in the Gulf of Tonkin. Under the operational control of Captain John J. Herrick, it steamed through the Gulf of Tonkin collecting intelligence. Suffice to say here that the version as presented here by Marolda and Fitzgerald is highly credible and completely plausible, and I for one am persuaded of its correctness. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. Over the next 12 hours, as the president's team scrambledto understand what hadhappened and to organize a response, the facts remained elusive. . The bullets struck the destroyer; the torpedo missed. The Gulf of Tonkin act became more controversial as opposition to the war mounted. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) challenged the account, and argued that despite evidence that 34A missions and Desoto patrols were not operating in tandem, Hanoi could only have concluded that they were. The "nada notion" -- that nothing happened and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was the product of inexperienced sonarmen and the overworked imagination of young deck-watch officers -- can no longer be sustained. The string of intelligence mistakes, mistranslations, misinterpretations and faulty decision making that occurred in the Tonkin Gulf in 1964 reveals how easily analysts and officials can jump to the wrong conclusions and lead a nation into war. . The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. Interpretation by historians as to what exactly did and did not occur during those few days in early August 1964 remains so varied that the wonder is that authors Marolda and Fitzgerald were able themselves to settle on the text. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of 400 yards per minute. Around midday on Aug. 4, Adm. Grant Sharp, the top navy commander in the Pacific, made a call to the Joint Chiefs, and it was clear there were significant doubts about this second incident. The Health Conspiracy. The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. 1, Vietnam 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 611. Not reported at the time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. For the Navys official account stating that both incidents occurred and that 34A and Desoto were "entirely distinct," see Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". Naval Institute. Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. It was 1964, an election year, and the Republicans had just nominated Barry Goldwater, a former jet fighter pilot, and hardcore hawk, to run against Johnson in November. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. In late 2007, that information was finally made public when an official National Security Agency (NSA) history of signals intelligence (SIGINT) in Vietnam, written in 2002, was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. Any escalation in the bombing of the North risked provoking the Russians or, more likely, the Chinese. Navy, Of course, none of this was known to Congress, which demanded an explanation for the goings-on in the Tonkin Gulf. To increase the chances of success, SOG proposed increased raids along the coast, emphasizing offshore bombardment by the boats rather than inserting commandos. 1. With this information, back in Washington President Johnson and his advisers considered their options. Four boats, PTF-1, PTF-2 (the American-made patrol boats), PTF-5, and PTF-6 (Nasty boats), were on their way to bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the banks of the nearby Ron River, both about 90 miles north of the DMZ. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. The accords, which were signed by other participants including the Viet Minh, mandated a temporary ceasefire line, which separated southern and northern Vietnam to be governed by the State of Vietnam an They never intended to attack U.S. forces, and were not even within 100 nautical miles of the U.S. destroyers position at the time of the purported second engagement.. 10. By 1400 hours EDT, the president had approved retaliatory strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases for the next morning, August 5, at 0600 local time, which was 1900 EDT on August 4 in Washington. People are human and make mistakes, particularly in the pressure of a crisis or physical threat to those they support. . As is common with specialized histories -- what I call the "tunnels of Cu Chi" syndrome -- this book will tell most readers more about the U.S. Navy in Vietnam than they care to know. After the Tonkin Gulf incident, the State Department cabled Seaborn, instructing him to tell the North Vietnamese that "neither the Maddox or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam] islands." As such, its personnel in Vietnam were the envy of their Army counterparts in the bush since, as it was commonly put, sailors sleep between clean sheets at night (the grunts were also envious of the Air Force, where you fight sitting down). Unable to catch the fast South Vietnamese PTFs, the government in Hanoi elected to strike instead at USS Maddox. Midday on August 1, NSGA San Miguel, the U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT detachment co-located with the U.S. Army at Phu Bai, and Maddoxs own DSU all detected the communications directing the North Vietnamese torpedo boats to depart from Haiphong on August 2. Aircraft from Ticonderoga arrived on-scene at 1528 hours and fired on the boats. Simultaneously, U.S. SIGINT was placed on increased alert to monitor indications of future North Vietnamese threats to the Desoto Missions, and additional air and naval forces were deployed to the Western Pacific. WebCongress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. The conspiracy theory has been dying for several years, and this work will probably be a stake through its heart. You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. Within the year, U.S. bombers would strike North Vietnam, and U.S. ground units would land on South Vietnamese soil. All missed, probably because the North Vietnamese had fired too soon. Retrieved from https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. It can be deceived and it is all too often incomplete. The entirety of the original intercepts, however, were not examined and reanalyzed until after the war. Seventh Fleet reduced it to 12 nautical miles. 136-137. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. 9. PTF-2 had mechanical troubles and had to turn back, but the other boats made it to their rendezvous point off the coast from Vinh Son. On the night of 4 August, both ships reported renewed attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats. The three torpedo boats continued through the American barrage and launched their torpedoes at 1516. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. He also requested air support. After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. But, to me, the more pernicious deception was this idea that American ships were sailing innocently in the Gulf of Tonkin and were attacked without provocation, he continues. Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. Unfortunately, much of the media reporting combined or confused the events of August 2 and 4 into a single incident. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. Both South Vietnamese and U.S. maritime operators in Da Nang assumed that their raids were the cause of the mounting international crisis, and they never for a moment doubted that the North Vietnamese believed that the raids and the Desoto patrols were one and the same. Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. Subscribe now and never hit a limit. He has appeared on The History Channel as a featured expert. Both sides claimed successes in the exchange that they did not actually achieve. The Tonkin Gulf Incident in the past two decades has been treated by at least three full-scale studies, dealt with at length by Congressional committees and extensively referenced in general histories, presidential memoirs and textbooks on the U.S. legislative function. :: Douglas Pike, director of the Indochina Studies Program at the University of California-Berkeley, is the author of the forthcoming "Vietnam and the U.S.S.R.: Anatomy of an Alliance.". Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964. McNamara insisted that the evidence clearly indicated there was an attack on August 4, and he continued to maintain so in his book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons From Vietnam. Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. Moments later, one of the crewmen spotted a North Vietnamese Swatow patrol boat bearing down on them. In response, the North Vietnamese boat launched a torpedo. This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. After the incident, Herrick was unsure that his ships had been attacked, reporting at 1:27 a.m. Washington time that "Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. On Tuesday morning, Aug. 4, 1964, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara called President Lyndon Johnson with a report about a possible confrontation brewing in southeast Asia. With that false foundation in their minds, the on-scene naval analysts saw the evidence around them as confirmation of the attack they had been warned about. Moreover, the subsequent review of the evidence exposed the translation and analysis errors that resulted in the reporting of the salvage operation as preparations for a second attack. Consequently, while Maddox was in the patrol area, a South Vietnamese commando raid was underway southwest of its position. The Johnson administration had made the first of several secret diplomatic attempts during the summer of 1964 to convince the North Vietnamese to stop its war on South Vietnam, using the chief Canadian delegate to the ICC, J. Blair Seaborn, to pass the message along to Hanoi. Hanoi denied the charge that it had fired on the U.S. destroyers on 4 August, calling the charge "an impudent fabrication. Top Essentials to Know About the Vietnam War, Timeline of the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War), Vietnam War: General William Westmoreland, M.S., Information and Library Science, Drexel University, B.A., History and Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. In the first few days of August 1964, a series of events off the coast of North Vietnam and decisions made in Washington, D.C., set the United States on a course that would largely define the next decade and weigh heavily on American foreign policy to this day. The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. Operations Security (OPSEC) concerns and related communications restrictions prevented Maddox and its operational commanders up to the Seventh Fleet from knowing of the commando raid. And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. At 1505, when the torpedo boats had closed within 10,000 yards, in accordance with Captain Herricks orders and as allowed under international law at that time, Maddox fired three warning shots. The Maddox fired againthis time to killhitting the second North Vietnamese boat just as it launched two torpedoes. In addition, the US Navy was instructed to conduct Desoto patrols off North Vietnam. . They were nicknamed "gassers" because they burned gasoline rather than diesel fuel. Mr. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1992), p. 59. To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. Although North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap admitted in a 1984 discussion with Robert S. McNamara that the first attack was deliberate, he denied that a second attack had ever taken place. Efforts to communicate with the torpedo boats failed, probably because of language and communications equipment incompatibility. WebTo many online conspiracy theorists, the biggest false flag operation of all time was the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin is shown in 1963. The first reports of the encounter from the destroyers reached the White House at 1000 EDT. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. Three days later, she rendezvoused with a tanker just east of the DMZ before beginning her intelligence- gathering mission up the North Vietnamese coast. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration . Along with other American warships, Maddox was steaming in international waters some 28 nautical miles off North Vietnams coast, gathering information on that countrys coastal radars. When Did the U.S. Nigerians await election results in competitive race. Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. These PTFs were manned by South Vietnamese crews and conducted a series of coastal attacks against targets in North Vietnam as part of Operation 34A. The historian here is obliged to deal with two basic considerations in offering up an accounting: the event itself -- that is, what actually happened there in the waters off North Vietnam in early August 1964; and the uses made of it by President Lyndon Johnson and his administration. 8. In the end the Navy agreed, and in concert with MACV, took steps to ensure that "34A operations will be adjusted to prevent interference" with Desoto patrols.7 This did not mean that MACV did not welcome the information brought back by the Desoto patrols, only that the two missions would not actively support one another. . Arguing that he did not seek a "wider war," Johnson stated the importance of showing that the United States would "continue to protect its national interests." Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. Or purchase a subscription for unlimited access to real news you can count on. WebLyndon Johnson signed the Tonkin Gulf resolution on August 10, 1964. A firewall existed between covert patrol-boat attacks on North Vietnamese positions and Desoto patrols eavesdropping on shore-based communications. At each point, the ship would stop and circle, picking up electronic signals before moving on. With a presidential election just three months away and Johnson positioning himself as the peace candidate, the administration spoke of American resolve not to react to provocation and to avoid escalation. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter. 13. 9/11. (2021, February 16). HistoryNet.com is brought to you by HistoryNet LLC, the worlds largest publisher of history magazines. AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . Cookies collect information about your preferences and your devices and are used to make the site work as you expect it to, to understand how you interact with the site, and to show advertisements that are targeted to your interests. It is not NSA's intention to prove or ", "No," replied McCone. In fact, an earlier Desoto patrol planned for February had been canceled because of concerns over potential interference with South Vietnamese commando missions scheduled for the same time.
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